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iAbstract
How does the reception of remittances change the views of those left behind? In
this paper, we compare the impact of financial remittances (transmission of money)
with the impact of social remittances (transmission of ideas and values) on preferences
about the role of the state in the economy (in particular, the role of the state in
creating jobs, reducing inequality, and securing citizens’ well-being). Using data
from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008–2010), we find that social
learning via cross-border communication is positively associated with preference for an
enhanced role of the state.
Keywords: International migration, Remittances, Social remittances, Trans-nationalism,
Welfare state, Latin America, Developing countriesIntroduction
How does out-migration shape the views of those left behind? In this paper, we focus
on the role of financial remittances versus social learning in shaping the views of the
role of the state as an economic and welfare provider. On the one hand, we
hypothesize that the receipt of financial remittances may induce a process of political
disengagement from the state that will be reflected in lower expectations concerning
its role in the economy and as provider of jobs and social welfare. This is due to the
fact that remittances increase the income of families, who can now devote more
resources to privately securing jobs, public goods, and welfare for themselves. On the
other hand, those left behind also receive what are termed social remittances; that is,
ideas, values, and information about policies in the countries where their emigrant
relatives live (Levitt, 1998, 2001; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011). If emigrants settle
down in developed countries, those that remain at home may be exposed to information
about the role of the state in those destinations via cross-border conversations. This
might induce those left behind to expect an enhanced role of the state via more active
economic and redistributive policies.
Latin America is an ideal laboratory to study the effect of financial remittances and
social learning for two reasons. First, Latin America as a region is the second-largest
recipient of financial remittances in the world (World Bank, 2014). And second, in
contrast to emigration in other geographic regions, most emigration from Latin
America settles down in developed countries. Thus, it is safe to hypothesize that those2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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state plays as a welfare provider via communication with their emigrant relatives.
We put these two alternative hypotheses to test using survey data for 18 Latin American
countries in the years 2008 and 2010.1 We find that although those who receive financial
remittances envisage a limited role for the state, this effect is not statistically significant.
In contrast, those with relatives abroad and who often communicate with them; that is,
those more exposed to a process of social learning, prefer an enhanced role for the state
in comparison to respondents without relatives abroad. When we control for non-
random selection of those who are dependent on remittances and who communicate with
family abroad, we find that the positive effect of social remittances is stronger than the
negative effect of financial remittances, which is practically inexistent. Moreover, we find
that the impact of communication with emigrant relatives has the greatest impact in Latin
American countries that devote less resources to social spending and where per capita
GDP is lower.
This paper contributes to the incipient but fast-growing literature on the impact of
emigration in home country politics and policies in several ways. First, whereas most of
the studies to date have explored the impact of emigration on attitudes toward democ-
racy and political behavior of those left behind, we look into how outmigration shapes
attitudes regarding the economic and social role of the state. Second, too frequently,
the impacts of social and financial remittances are studied in isolation from each other,
with the former receiving much less attention. Yet there are reasons to think that
trans-border communication is an important omitted variable when studying the impact
of financial remittances and vice versa. Indeed, in our study, after social remittances are
accounted for, financial remittances appear inconsequential in shaping opinions about
whether the state should create jobs and guarantee the well-being and equality of individ-
uals. Finally, besides comparing the relative role of financial and social remittances, this
paper exploits the variation in socio-economic development in Latin American to provide
a regional comparison.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the economic consequences
of remittances. In Section 2, we discuss the implications that social learning may have
in shaping the perceptions of what roles the state is expected to perform. Both sections
motivate our alternative hypotheses concerning the contrasting role of financial vs.
social remittances in shaping views about the roles of the state. Section 3 discusses the
data and the methods. In Section 4, we discuss the main results and extensions. Finally,
we conclude in Section 5.
Financial remittances and the State
According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), remittances to Latin
America amounted to US$ 61.3 billion in 2012. In relative terms, their importance varies
considerably within the region. Some Latin American countries such as Honduras,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua are highly dependent on them – remittances amount to
more than 15 % of their GDP – whereas Argentina or Brazil receive remittances
that do not reach 1 % of their GDP (Maldonado & Hayem, 2013).
Only recently have political scientists and political economists started to systematically
look into the political consequences that these flows and outmigration more generally
may have for sending countries (see Kapur, 2014; Meseguer & Burgess, 2014; Mosley &
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oral vs. non-electoral political behavior (Careja & Emmenegger, 2012; Germano, 2013;
Goodman & Hiskey, 2008; Nyblade & O’Mahony, 2014; O’Mahony, 2013; Pérez-
Armendáriz & Crow, 2010; Dionne, Inman & Montinola, 2014), as well as on the impact of
remittances on the survival of autocrats and the likelihood of democratization (Ahmed,
2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, & Wright, 2015; Moses, 2011; Pfutze, 2012, 2013). Whether
remittances constitute yet another resource curse that may feed government corruption is
another subject on the research agenda (Tyburski, 2012, 2014). Surprisingly, the impact that
remittances may have on governments’ policy choices has been less researched (Ketkar &
Ratha, 2010; Leblang, 2010; Singer, 2010). In particular, there is practically no evidence as to
how governments may alter their provision of social welfare and public goods in the presence
of family remittances, which substitute for those goods and provide a form of private insur-
ance (Ebeke, 2011). In his study of how remittances impact autocrats’ public spending choices,
Ahmed (2012) contends that autocrats in countries that receive remittances spend less on
welfare (as families privately spend more on it) and more on patronage. By so doing, autocrats
are able to extend their tenure in power. According to Doyle (2015), Latin American
governments that received large inflows of remittances did reduce their spending on
social contributions in the period 1990–2009. The author relates this trend to remittance
recipients’ electoral preferences for less redistribution.
A discussion of the consequences of what the inflow of remittances may imply for
individual perceptions of the role of the state has to start with an overview of the
effects that are attributed to remittances. Also, it is crucial to explore the type of uses
that remittances are typically given. The effects and uses of remittances are multifaceted
and in many instances context-specific. In the empirical analysis, we shall explore the
opinions of Latin American respondents regarding the role of the state as provider of jobs
and welfare. Thus, in what follows, we focus on what we know about the impact of remit-
tances in Latin America in relation to labor markets, social and public spending, poverty,
and inequality. The discussion is necessary because we claim that the alleged conse-
quences of remittances are likely to shape individual views concerning what the state
should or should not provide. In particular, we claim that financial remittances, via their
effect on household incomes, should increase recipients’ ability to earn a living without
relying on the state (McMann, 2006, p.23).
First, according to some research, remittances may be associated with a reduction in
the labor supply as individuals who receive remittances have higher reservation wages
and go out of the labor market, increasing their preference for leisure (Fajnzylber &
López, 2007; World Bank, 2006a, 2006b). The evidence is not conclusive, though, and
seems to relate mostly to women and child labor (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006a,
2006b). Posso (2012) looks into data on sixty-six developing countries from the Middle
East and Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean (1985–
2005). The author finds a positive and significant relationship between remittances and
aggregate labor supply. One of the explanations that the author entertains is that remit-
tances facilitate employment creation by easing credit constraints. In any case, both
these consequences are likely to affect views about the role of the state in creating
jobs, either because remittance recipients decide to opt out of the labor market or be-
cause remittances allow them to undertake entrepreneurship activities that facilitate
their self-employment.
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remittances reduces the level and severity of poverty in developing countries, and other
cross-country studies provide similar evidence (IMF 2005; Ratha, Mohapatra, Özden, Plaza,
Shaw, & Shimeles, 2011). Moreover, remittances are countercyclical, increasing in the event
of bad economic conditions in home countries, for example following natural disasters and
financial crises (Chami, Barajas, Cosimano, Fullenkamp, Gapen, & Montial, 2008;
Fajnzylber & López, 2007; World Bank, 2006a, 2006b). This provides families with
a buffer with which to smooth their consumption. Particularly in Latin America,
remittances are seen as effective in reducing poverty (Fajnzylber & López, 2007).
Third, according to numerous case studies, remittances are used to finance current
consumption and other investments from housing to education and health.2 In Latin
America, an increase in human capital investment seems to be the case, but promin-
ently among household recipients located in the middle and upper quintiles of the
income distribution (Fajnzylber & López, 2007). In Guatemala, Adams and Cuécuecha
(2010) report that households receiving international remittances spend more on
education and housing compared to what they would have spent without remittances.
And in Ecuador, Calero and Bedi (2009) find that remittances increase school enrol-
ment and decrease the incidence of child work, especially for girls and in rural areas.
Concerning health, Ponce, Olivié, and Onofa (2011) find that in Ecuador, remittances have
an impact on health expenditures and on some preventive health care such as vaccination.
In Mexico, Valero-Gil (2009) finds a significant effect of remittances on household health
expenditures. Interestingly, the author finds that the finding holds for households without
access to employer medical insurance. Importantly for our argument, Drabo and Ebeke
(2010) report among other findings that remittances induce a change in use of health care
services from the public to the private sector for household recipients located in the
middle of the income distribution. Overall, financial remittances could potentially increase
the demand for health and education services although it is doubtful that more public
services of this kind are demanded.
Finally, remittances are also used to finance the provision of local public goods such
as clean water, sewage systems, paving, electricity, and other local infrastructure. There
is abundant evidence that remittances, either in the form of collective remittances sent
by hometown associations (HTAs) or individual remittances, improve local and social
infrastructure in the recipient communities (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2012; Burgess, 2005;
Iskander, 2010; Orozco, 2003). For instance, Duquette (2014) finds that co-production
schemes such as the Three for One program in Mexico improved citizens’ access to
public sanitation, sewage, and water. And in their study based on Mexican municipalities,
Adida and Girod (2011) show that families devote remittances to improving sewage and
water provision. This means that remittance recipients exert an active role as non-state
providers of public goods, which very likely increases respondents’ autonomy with respect
to the expected tasks that the state should carry out.
Thus, a wealth of studies show that remittances reduce poverty and are used by families
to privately provide themselves with certain goods typically provided by states. Moreover,
based on Latinbarometer data, Doyle (2015) shows that those individuals who receive
remittances are significantly more likely to think that the distribution of income is fair in
their countries. Accordingly, the author hypothesizes that these individuals are less likely
to consider that the state should be given a more active role in equalizing incomes.
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households typically give to them, we hypothesize that in comparison to non–remittance
recipients, individuals that receive remittances and for whom remittances represent a
substantial amount of their income will exhibit lower rates of agreement with the state
playing a role in job creation and social safety net provision. This is because by increasing
their incomes, remittances reduce recipients’ dependence on the state as compared to
non-remittance recipients.
Social remittances and the State
Through a broad range of channels, emigrants may potentially influence attitudes and
behaviors in their origin countries (Kapur, 2010, 2014). The prospect of future emigra-
tion fed by networks abroad may induce those planning to leave to become politically
disengaged prior to their departure (Hiskey, Montalvo, & Orcés, 2014). However, the in-
volvement by participants in a diaspora in their local communities back home may have
the opposite effect on those left behind (Burgess, 2012). Beyond financial remittances,
one way in which migrants shape the views of those at home is through frequent
communication and regular trips back and forth. Thus, so-called social remittances –
the “ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending
country communities” (Levitt, 1998, p.927) – spur a process of social learning that, we
argue here, may affect broad attitudes toward the role of the state in home countries.
In this section, we argue that communication with relatives abroad may induce a
“scale-out” effect, impacting the perception of broader aspects of governance, such as
the economic and social roles of the state. As Levitt and Lamba-Nieves put it (2011),
while Peggy Levitt’s early research on the sort of information that was shared between
emigrants and their relatives back home “did not consider the state responsible for
providing basic services”, her recent research shows that residents “see those activities
(…) as part and parcel of what constitutes good governance” (p. 17–18).
In her insightful work on trans-border vs. face-to-face conversations, Pérez-
Armendáriz (2014) shows that emigrants possess certain features that make them worth
listening to and emulating. One of these has to do precisely with the fact that emigrants
abroad are a source of income; but another reason is that emigrants open up the prospect
of future emigration for those left behind, too. The fact that those that leave tend to be
the family members considered the most apt for the endeavour – 70 % of emigrant
households send the household head abroad (Riosmena & Massey, 2012) – makes the
relationship between them and those left behind asymmetrical.
Several preconditions are necessary for the social learning process to occur. First, em-
igrants should be in regular contact with their relatives back home. In Latin American
countries, this is indeed the case. Soehl and Waldinger (2010) state “the simple phone
call (…) plays a central role for the majority of migrants” (p. 1498). According to the
Americas Barometer on which our empirical study is based, 21.5 % of voting-age citi-
zens living in Latin American countries communicate at least once a week with their
relatives abroad. In the interviews that Pérez-Armendáriz (2014) carried out, it is made
evident that one of the consequences of having relatives abroad and communicating
with them is that non-migrants become aware of the importance of keeping informed.
For instance, one of the non-migrants the author interviewed stated that “I think it’s
important to know what is going on. I did not pay attention before.” And another
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happening in the north because our son lives there and because our life also depends
on what is going on outside this country” (p. 79).
Second, what kind of information do emigrants share with their relatives? Pérez-
Armendáriz (2014, p.75) provides a nice account of the wide range of topics typically
covered by trans-border conversations. Mexican émigrés do share with their families
their experiences with public and political life in the host country. A high 85 % of
emigrants discussed experiences concerning issues such as support for institutions, civic
responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and respect for individual human rights with
their families in Mexico. This is not surprising taking into account that Latin American
emigration is partly driven by concerns about poor state capacity, violence, and
malfunctioning democracies (Elías & Massey, 2010; Hiskey, Montalvo, & Orces, 2014).
Most fundamentally, however, the overall lack of economic opportunities continues
to be a powerful push factor in the decision to migrate. Wage differentials and better
job opportunities are indeed the primary cause of emigration among Latin Americans
(Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2003; Takenaka & Pren, 2010; Durand & Massey, 2010).
Unsurprisingly, in many of the conversations reported in Pérez-Armendáriz’s research,
it is made clear that emigrants think that more opportunities became open to them
thanks to emigration. For instance, a woman who arrived in the US and managed to
complete high school communicated to her family that “[T] he government here
[in the US] provides a lot of opportunities…” And an undocumented woman with a
brother back home with learning disabilities stated “I am always telling my parents that it
is possible for adults with disabilities to work and become more independent. They can
live lives that are almost normal” (Pérez-Armendáriz, 2014, p.76).
Finally, the information that emigrants communicate to their families abroad argu-
ably depends on where the emigrants settle down, their pre-departure characteristics,
and obviously on their experience as emigrants (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011: 3). This
is important as one should not take for granted that trans-border communication will
always lead to the transmission of “positive” information. For example, in his study on
the impact of foreign education on democracy based on a panel of foreign students
since the 1950s, Spilimbergo (2009) finds that foreign-educated individuals promote
democracy in their home country, but only if the foreign education is acquired in
democratic countries. Thus, whether the informational spillover will be positive or
negative depends on whether emigrants choose to settle in well governed countries that
offer better opportunities to emigrants in comparison to home countries or not.3
In the case of Latin America, most emigrants establish their residence in advanced
countries. According to OECD data (Dumont, Spielvogel & Widmaier, 2010, p.17)
the highest emigration rates in the region are from El Salvador, Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua, and Mexico. Fifty-nine percent of total emigrants from Nicaragua settle down
in other developing countries, mainly Costa Rica. However, emigrants from the other
three high emigration countries overwhelmingly settle down in the United States
(United Nations, 2010).
In view of the above, we hypothesize that via communication with émigrés, non-
migrants will express a preference for a state that is present and active in guaranteeing
better opportunities through the provision of welfare and more job opportunities. Thus,
unlike the impact of financial remittances, we expect that those who communicate with
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state playing an active role in the economy and in the provision of social safety nets.
Ideally, we would like to extend our analysis to make it conditional on the destination
country of the relative. However, this is complicated for two reasons:
First, the survey we employ does not allow us to know with clarity where the relatives
settle down. There is a question that allows respondents to choose between (1) relatives
in the US, (2) relatives in the US and other countries, or (3) relatives in other countries
(not the US). About 20 % say they have relatives abroad, but about half of them say
they have family in other countries, without our being able to distinguish whether
“other countries” refers to other developed countries (Canada or Europe) or to other
countries in the Latin American region or elsewhere. And second, the content of the
information sent by the migrant depends not only on the immigration regime and
integration policies of the destination country, but also on the particular features of the
emigrant relative (such as her legal status, employment status, and level of qualifica-
tion), which determine how the emigrant integrates.
Unfortunately, since the survey we use was fielded in origin countries, we cannot
observe or control for these features.4 But we can control for the features of respon-
dents in home countries and for certain characteristics of their national contexts. In
the extension to our analysis, we account for heterogeneous effects associated with the
different levels of development and varying presence of the state where those left
behind live. As Kapur (2014, p.489) puts it, the influence of emigrants “is likely to be
greater when the formal institutional structures in the country of origin are weaker.”
And in line with other studies (O’Mahoney, 2013; Nyblade & O’Mahony, 2014), we
hypothesize that the strongest impact of trans-border communication between émigrés
and their families will occur in less developed origin countries, where the role of the
state in reducing social and economic risks is comparatively smaller.
Data and methods
We put these alternative hypotheses to test using data for 18 Latin American countries
from the 2008 and 2010 waves of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP),
commissioned by Vanderbilt University. Our dependent variables are three questions
concerning agreement with the role of the state in the following functions (1) the state,
rather than individuals, should be primarily responsible for providing jobs; (2) the state,
rather than the private sector, should ensure the well-being of the people; and (3) the state
should reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. These are variables that
range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating more agreement with the state playing
those roles. We treat these variables as continuous and estimate OLS models.
Our main independent variables measure whether a household receives remittances
and whether the individual has relatives living abroad (family abroad). These two
covariates are dichotomous variables that take the value 1 if respondents receive remit-
tances and if they have family abroad. Most individuals that receive remittances have
family abroad.5 However, 65 % of individuals with a family abroad do not receive remit-
tances (the correlation between the two variables is 0.47). Approximately 10 % of those
surveyed receive remittances and 21 % have relatives that used to live in the household
and are now living abroad. 6As can be seen in Fig. 1, the highest percentages of respon-
dents declaring that the household receives remittances are found in El Salvador,
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Honduras
Paraguay
Guatemala
Bolivia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Mexico
Costa Rica
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Colombia
Argentina
Chile
Brazil
Venezuela
receiving remittances with family abroad
Fig. 1 Percentage of individuals with family abroad and percentage of individuals receiving remittances.
Mean by country, 2008–2010 (LAPOP)
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which the most respondents have a relative abroad.
We also use two other questions to measure the intensity of the dependence on
remittances and the intensity of communication with relatives abroad. The variable
dependence takes a value of 0 if respondents state that they do not receive remittances
and a value of 4 if respondents claim that the household income strongly depends on
remittances. The variable contact measures the intensity of communication with those
abroad and ranges from 0 for individuals that do not claim to have any relative abroad
to 5 for individuals that claim to have a relative abroad and talk to their emigrant rela-
tives on a daily basis. Again, communication with the relatives is a fact. In practically
all countries, a minimum of 20 % of those with family abroad talk to them either every
day or once per week. The figure is over 40 % in the Dominican Republic, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Paraguay.
In line with the hypotheses set out in the theoretical framework, we expect that those
who receive remittances do not envisage a large role for the state in creating jobs and
ameliorating risks when compared to those who do not receive remittances. This is
because, as mentioned in the theory section, remittance recipients are more capable of
providing jobs, welfare, and local public goods for themselves. In contrast, given what
we know about the content of communication with relatives abroad, it may well be the
case that those exposed to the experience of their relatives in states that offer more
opportunities would express more agreement with the view that the state rather than
the private sector or the individual should be the guarantor of social and economic
well-being for its citizens. Note the importance of including both variables in the ana-
lysis since we claim that social remittances and financial remittances may have effects
that counter each other.
Of course, there may be other variables shaping views of what roles the state should
undertake, and therefore we control for them. First, we include a control for a respon-
dent’s overall perception of government efficacy. This is an additive index of three
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governments are in fighting poverty, unemployment, and insecurity (efficacy). We
expect those individuals who think that their governments are efficacious to support a
more active role for the state in the economy, all things being equal. We also control
for level of interest in politics (interest), because if, as we argue, trans-border conversa-
tions impact opinions about the role of the state in any meaningful way, overall levels
of political interest appear as a relevant intervening variable we need to control for.
Higher values of this variable indicate less interest in politics.
We then control for a set of socio-demographic variables: age, age squared, gender
(male), the respondent’s level of education, marital status, employment status, and race
(white). To control for socioeconomic status (ses), we used factor analysis to come up
with measures that we consider more reliable than a measure of self-reported income.
These indicators are based on a set of eleven relevant questions that capture whether
respondents have certain possessions in their houses (ses1) and certain services such as
indoor plumbing and bathrooms (ses2) that are an indirect indication of their income.
Moreover, some of the items that are included in the list (television, cell phone, con-
ventional phone) are clearly related to the capacity of those left behind to be exposed
to the experiences and information of their emigrant relatives.7
The econometric models are:
Roles of the Stateijt ¼ α þ βRemittancesij þ χFamilyAbroadijt þ
δGov’Efficacyijt þ ϕPol’Interestijt þ γSociodemogijt þ μj þ vt þ εijt
ð1Þ
Roles of the Stateijt ¼ α þ βDependenceij þ χContactijt þ δGov’Efficacyijt þ
ϕPol’Interestijt þ γSociodemogijt þ μj þ vt þ εijt
ð2Þ
where i, j, t refer to individual i in country j in year t. Model (1) explores the impact of
remittances and of having relatives abroad and Model (2) focuses on the intensity of
dependence on remittances and the intensity of contact with relatives. In both models,
the dependent variables are opinions about the roles that the state should play. Accord-
ing to our hypotheses, we expect β to be negative and χ to be positive. To control for
time-invariant country characteristics, we include country and year fixed effects in all
the estimations.
Results
Baseline models
The results of our baseline models are shown in Table 1. Receiving monetary remittances
(Models 1–3) or being highly dependent on them (Models 4–6) is unrelated to respon-
dents’ attitudes concerning whether the state should play a major role in providing jobs,
social welfare, and in reducing inequality, net of other factors. However, having family
abroad (Models 1–3) and being in contact with them (Models 4–6) are positively associ-
ated with believing that the state should have an active role in improving the welfare of
the majority, and in creating jobs. Thus, concerning attitudes towards the role of the state,
we do not find any evidence of disengagement that could be attributed to the receipt of
financial remittances, which are not statistically significant in shaping those attitudes.
Unlike financial remittances, it seems that having relatives abroad and being in con-
tact with them positively impacts the beliefs of those left behind in the sense of
Table 1 Financial vs. social remittances and the role of the state (baseline models)
Create jobs Ensure well-being Reduce
inequality
Create jobs Ensure well-being Reduce
inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittances 0.026 0.014 0.043
[0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
Family Abroad 0.048** 0.042** 0.0311*
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019]
Dependence −0.000755 −0.00290 0.00671
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009]
Contact 0.0221*** 0.0176** 0.0110*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Gov’t efficacy 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.0183*** 0.0232*** 0.0302***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Political interest 0.019** −0.014* −0.035*** 0.0193** −0.0137* −0.0353***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
Intercept 5.739*** 5.114*** 5.680*** 5.734*** 5.114*** 5.683***
[0.070] [0.072] [0.070] [0.070] [0.072] [0.070]
Observations 54089 53910 53796 53951 53773 53654
R2 0.060 0.041 0.061 0.061 0.042 0.061
Sociodemographic
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status race,
socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in brackets *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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well-being of citizens, and reducing inequality (significant at 10 %), net of other factors.
These results are robust to controlling for two relevant variables. As expected, those
individuals that regard the state as efficient think that the state should play a greater
role in reducing economic and social risks.8 The impact of interest in politics operates
according to the theory. Those that have less interest in politics tend to endorse the
view that the state should play a secondary role in its social functions. However, re-
spondents with less interest in politics also think that the state should provide jobs and
this holds after controlling for their employment status and other socio-demographic
characteristics. There are other consistent patterns that show in the results, all in the
expected direction. Respondents who enjoy a higher socioeconomic status think that
the state should play a less important role in the economy and in the provision of social
welfare. The same occurs among more educated individuals.
Overall, and contrary to our expectations, reception of financial remittances does
not shape in any meaningful way the attitudes that those left behind have of the roles
of the state after we control for social remittances. Only in two out of six models do
remittances have the hypothesized negative coefficient, with individuals whose house-
holds are highly dependent on remittances being less likely to agree with the state
providing jobs and securing respondents’ wellbeing. However, the coefficient is never
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 11 of 29statistically significant. On the contrary, social remittances proxied by having rela-
tives abroad and having high levels of contact with them do shape perception of the
roles that the state should play in the direction of increasing expectations about
those roles.Robustness
One frequent concern when estimating the impact of remittances and relatives on atti-
tudes and behaviors is that individuals who receive remittances and have relatives
abroad are unlikely to be a representative sample of the population. In other words,
these individuals may have other characteristics that make them hold different views
about the role of the state in the economy to start with. Thus, the coefficient for trans-
border communication might be a biased and inconsistent estimate of the causal effect
if having family abroad is associated with unobservable aspects of individuals included
in the error term. If we fail to control for this problem we will not be able to identify
whether the estimated effect of trans-border communication is due to trans-border
communication itself or to other factors that are present among those who have
emigrant relatives but absent among those who do not have family abroad. In order to
address non-random selection concerns, we fit a new set of models where a matching
estimator nonparametrically balances pre-treatment characteristics of individuals across
the trans-border communication variable to obtain the best possible estimate of the
causal effect of social remittances (Morgan & Winship, 2010, p.89).9 We employ a pro-
pensity score matching (PSM) procedure to estimate the probability of having relatives
abroad and select only matched sets of treatment and control cases that contain
individuals with equivalent values for these predicted probabilities.10 By doing so, we
can separate the effect of cross-border conversation from other pre-existing features
that may predispose respondents to hold views of a more proactive state. We concen-
trate on the impact of social remittances and show the results for financial remittances
in Table 7 in Appendix A.11
Table 2 shows the OLS estimation and compares it with results from PSM
models. Correcting for non-random selection, and net of other factors, individuals
with a relative abroad are significantly more likely to think that the state, rather
than the private sector, should ensure the well-being of society and play a funda-
mental role in creating jobs. Inequality reduction is also significant at 10 %, though
the difference of having or not having relatives abroad has a smaller impact. The
coefficients estimated with the PSM models are larger in comparison to the non-
random selection models, suggesting that not controlling for endogeneity led to a
downward bias. Note as well the change in the sign of the coefficient of financial
remittances, which is now negative for the most part as we hypothesized, although
never statistically significant.
Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of each of the coefficients for the independent
variables. It can be observed that practically all of them except for having a relative
abroad are not statistically significant.
Another concern that we tackle is whether the null result we persistently get for
the role of monetary remittances in shaping the views of the roles of the state is
due to the fact that the category “having relatives abroad” subsumes those who
Table 2 Adjusted regressions (PSM), social remittances and the role of the state
Create jobs Ensure well-being Reduce inequality
OLS PSM OLS PSM OLS PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittances 0.026 −0.115 0.014 −0.052 0.043 −0.054
[0.026] [0.125] [0.027] [0.124] [0.026] [0.115]
Family abroad 0.048** 0.356*** 0.042** 0.300** 0.031* 0.200*
[0.019] [0.122] [0.020] [0.117] [0.019] [0.114]
Gov’t efficiency 0.018*** 0.028 0.024*** 0.041 0.031*** 0.044
[0.005] [0.034] [0.005] [0.032] [0.005] [0.032]
Political Interest 0.019** 0.032 −0.014* −0.032 −0.035*** 0.025
[0.007] [0.056] [0.008] [0.057] [0.007] [0.050]
Intercept 5.739*** 5.968*** 5.114*** 5.381*** 5.680*** 5.576***
[0.070] [0.510] [0.072] [0.455] [0.070] [0.468]
Observations 54,089 3,125 53,910 3,117 53,796 3,125
R2 0.060 0.086 0.041 0.070 0.061 0.069
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race,
socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in brackets *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 12 of 29receive remittances. Thus, having relatives abroad might arguably disguise any
effect that monetary remittances could potentially have.
To address this concern, we present below two sets of estimations. In Models 1–3,
we restrict the sample to those who declare they have a relative abroad, and look into
the effect of financial remittances in this subset of the population. The receipt ofFamily abroad
Remittances
Gov't efficacy
SES factor 1
SES factor 2
Political interest
Male
Employed
Married
Age
Age_sq
White
Education
-.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5
Ensure Well-Being Create Jobs Reduce Inequality
Fig. 2 Beta coefficients and CI for all variables (95 %), Models 2, 4 and 6, Table 2
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statistically significant for understanding the views of the role of the state in creating
jobs, reducing inequality, or securing the well-being of society. In Models 4–6, we in-
clude an interaction between the dummy for remittance reception and a categorical
variable that proxies the intensity of contact with émigré relatives.12 Given the substi-
tution effect that most of the literature attributes to financial remittances, our
expectation is that when contact is low, the impact of monetary remittances on the
perceptions of the role of the state should be negative. But as contact increases, the
circulation of ideas and experiences of emigrants and their transmission to those left
behind should have a positive effect on perceptions of the role of the state among
respondents back home. The state, rather than the individual or the private sector,
should be seen as responsible for ameliorating economic and social risks. Table 3
reveals that there is a positive interaction effect of financial remittances and social
remittances on perceptions about the role of the state at high levels of contact withTable 3 Financial remittances and the role of the state (OLS)
Create jobs Ensure
well-being
Reduce
inequality
Create jobs Ensure
well-being
Reduce
inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittances 0.0261 0.0183 0.0390 −0.0614 −0.0689 0.0123
[0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.0516] [0.0540] [0.0497]
Contact-Low 0.00807 0.0281 0.0447*
[0.0276] [0.0276] [0.0267]
Contact-Medium 0.0479 −0.0230 0.00753
[0.0351] [0.0403] [0.0356]
Contact-High 0.0635 0.0662 −0.000494
[0.0402] [0.0409] [0.0403]
Remittances*Contact-Low 0.0189 0.0429 0.0590
[0.0908] [0.0921] [0.0864]
Remittances*Contact-Medium 0.0296 0.108 −0.0500
[0.0747] [0.0795] [0.0747]
Remittances*Contact-High 0.161** 0.125* 0.123*
[0.0713] [0.0743] [0.0702]
Gov’t efficacy −0.0131 −0.00262 0.00225 0.0183*** 0.0235*** 0.0304***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.00460] [0.00474] [0.00466]
Political interest −0.00446 −0.0360** −0.0504*** 0.0189** −0.0145* −0.0361***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.00748] [0.00761] [0.00738]
Intercept 6.325*** 5.667*** 6.196*** 5.739*** 5.118*** 5.683***
[0.143] [0.148] [0.142] [0.0701] [0.0721] [0.0696]
N 11799 11751 11741 54009 53830 53711
R2 0.073 0.047 0.067 0.061 0.042 0.061
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race,
socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in brackets, *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 14 of 29relatives abroad (Models 4–6).13 In other words, it seems that financial remittances
only have a positive effect on perceptions about the role of the state when they are
accompanied by a high intensity of communication, as Fig. 9 in Appendix C shows.
This finding resonates with the literature that, rather than discussing social and
financial remittances as independent phenomena, sees them as complementing each
other (Batista & Narciso, 2013) and conceptualizes financial remittances as a social
act with multiple “scripts” (Carling, 2014).
Finally, it could be argued that it does not make much sense to look at all Latin
American countries given that some of them have very low rates of emigration and
hardly receive remittances (for instance, Brazil or Argentina). In Appendix C, Table 10,
we show that the results are robust to running the models on 10 high emigration and
remittance receiving countries (El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, and Colombia). The results are indeed
stronger, especially for opinions regarding the role of the state, rather than the individ-
ual, in the creation of jobs.
In sum, the results and robustness tests above confirm the findings of our baseline
models: when we control for communication with relatives abroad, financial remit-
tances have no bearing in shaping views about the roles of the state in the economy
(unless contact is very frequent). However, social remittances, that is, the flow of infor-
mation that happens to occur due to communication with relatives abroad do shape
these perceptions in the direction that we expected. Being exposed to trans-border
conversations about economic contexts that generally offer greater opportunities than
the origin countries, Latin Americans with relatives abroad envisage roles for the state
in which ideally the state becomes more involved in the creation of jobs and in
ensuring the well-being of society. We have proved that these results are robust to
selection and other concerns.14
Heterogeneous effects
As we argued in the theory section, two preconditions are necessary for the flow
of ideas via trans-border conversations to happen. First, communication has to
occur. Multiple previous studies as well as our data show that communication be-
tween emigrants and their families occurs frequently. And second, the impact that
this communication has arguably depends on the social-economic context in which
the recipient of social remittances lives. To be sure, the impact of communication
also depends on the integration policies in destination countries as well as the in-
dividual characteristics of the emigrant (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011). We tenta-
tively explore the effect of destination countries in Appendix B. However, for the
reasons we explained before, our data is better suited to address the mediating
effect of conditions in origin countries controlling for the characteristics of the remit-
tance recipient. In particular, we exploit the variation in the level of development and in
government spending on social protection to argue that the intensity of contact with
relatives abroad will have the greatest impact on less developed countries and in countries
where the state spends less on protecting its citizens.15 To illustrate, net of other factors,
we expect that trans-border communication with relatives will have a stronger impact in
shaping the views of a relative who has remained in El Salvador than a relative who has
remained in Argentina.
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 15 of 29To test this hypothesis, we include an interaction effect between the individual level
of contact with the relative abroad and the level of development (measured by the log
of per capita GDP). We also include an interaction effect between the intensity of
contact and the country level of social spending (measured by the log of per capita
social spending). We run random coefficient estimations that allow us to control for
the hierarchical nature of these models (individuals nested in countries). Figure 3 is
based on Models (3) and (4) in Table 4 and is confirmatory of our conditional hypoth-
esis. As we expected, the marginal effect of trans-border conversations between emi-
grants and those left behind regarding the role of the state (rather than the private
sector) in securing the well-being of individuals is positive and significant in countries
with low levels of social spending. This effect decreases and becomes non-significant in
countries where the communication takes place between an emigrant relative and a
respondent located in an origin country with greater social spending effort, net of other
characteristics of the recipient. The marginal effect of contact with relatives abroad on
perceptions about the role of the state (rather than the individual) in creating jobs is
also positive but lower for lower levels of development, although this finding is less
robust to alternative estimations. In other words, as we hypothesized, cross-border
conversations have the greatest impact in shaping views about the state as responsible
for creating jobs and ensuring the well-being of citizens in less developed Latin American
societies, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Dominican Republic or Honduras.16
Finally, the results we show in Appendix B are suggestive that destination matters.
The marginal effect of contact with relatives is positive and significant when high
percentages of a country’s emigrants settle down in the U.S., while a concentration of
emigration in other developing countries makes the marginal effect of contact with
relatives negative and insignificant. However, we should be wary of reading too much
into these results since we cannot rule out that it is the pre-departure social, economic,-.05
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Fig. 3 Marginal Effect of Contact with Emigrant Relatives on Views about the Role of the State
Table 4 Heterogeneous effects. Conditional effect of contact with relatives
HLM
Ensure well-being Create jobs Ensure well-being Create jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contact 0.176*** 0.162
[0.073] [0.135]
PubSpending (log) 0.0363
[0.080]
Contact*PubSpending(log) −0.0272*
[0.014]
Percapita GDP (log) 0.0195
[0.141]
Contact*Percapita GDP (log) −0.0164
[0.0176]
Remittances −0.0148 0.0329
[0.050] [0.060]
Gov’t efficacy 0.0230 0.0237
[0.002] [0.025]
Political interest −0.0262 0.00843
[0.008] [0.0213]
Individual Level and Interactions
Contact 0.0145* 0.0173
[0.008] [0.011]
Contact*PubSpending (log) −0.0186**
[0.008]
Contact*Percapita GDP (log) −0.0339**
[0.016]
Remittances −0.0146 −0.0241
[0.028] [0.028]
Gov’t efficacy 0.0394*** 0.0337***
[0.004] [0.004]
Political interest −0.0152** 0.0179**
[0.007] [0.007]
Constant 5.184*** 5.638*** 5.634*** 5.753***
[0.552] [1.283] [0.074] [0.084]
Country Level
PubSpending(log) 0.0490
[0.083]
Percapita GDP (log) −0.0290
[0.125]
Country level random effect u0 0.31 0.35
N1 53830 54009 53830 53559
N2 18 18
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race, socioeconomic
status. Columns (3) and (4) are HLM estimations. Country Level variables centered around the grand mean. Individual
Level variables centered around the country mean. Dummy variables are not centered. The slope of contact is allowed to
vary across countries
Robust Standard errors clustered on country in brackets; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 16 of 29
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 17 of 29and political characteristics of emigrants that select them into developed and develop-
ing countries that are driving the results. With these caveats in mind, if we put
together the results concerning the level of development in origin countries and
destination of emigration, countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
are the best candidates for social remittances to have a strong impact on the views of
relatives in home countries.Discussion
In this paper, we have claimed that the size of the emigration phenomenon and the
accompanying flows of money and ideas between émigrés and those left behind are too
important to be ignored. We have claimed that whereas the economic impact of
financial remittances has received considerable attention, the political consequences of
these flows are much less researched. Even less researched is the impact of informa-
tional flows or transmission of beliefs and ideas, also known as social remittances, on
political views and outcomes.
Although recent research has started to address this gap, most studies have so far
focused on the role of financial remittances in shaping political attitudes and behav-
iors. Much less attention has been paid to other outcomes that might plausibly be
affected by the reception of financial remittances and also by frequent communica-
tion with relatives abroad. In this paper, we hypothesized that financial remittances
and social remittances have opposite effects on attitudes toward the role of the state
with regard to economic and redistributive functions. In particular, because finan-
cial remittances substitute for social and public goods typically provided by the
state, we hypothesized that respondents who receive financial remittances would
have lower expectations regarding the roles of the state in providing jobs and in se-
curing the well-being of citizens in comparison to respondents who do not receive
remittances. Unlike financial remittances, communication with relatives abroad,
who generally settle in societies with better functioning states, might induce a
process of social learning among émigrés first, and then among their families back
home through trans-border conversations. As a result, we hypothesized that unlike
those individuals that do not have relatives abroad, respondents from emigrant fam-
ilies and who often communicate with them would be more likely to hold views in
favor of a pro-active state.
Empirical tests of these contrasting hypotheses against survey data for 18 Latin
American countries give support to the social remittances hypothesis: respondents
who communicate with relatives abroad are more likely to think that the state, more
than individuals or the private sector, should be active in creating jobs and in securing
the well-being of the population in comparison with respondents who do not have
family abroad. These results are robust to controlling for possible non-random selec-
tion effects. We did not find significant results for financial remittances. In view of our
and others’ findings (Levitt, 2001; Pérez-Armendáriz, 2014; Córdova & Hiskey, 2015),
we claim that studies that look at the impact of financial remittances without taking
into account social learning effects might be disregarding a crucial variable and in fact
essentially overestimating the impact of financial remittances. We also showed that
our main finding is conditional on certain origin country characteristics, notably the
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 18 of 29level of development and relative effort of the state in origin countries. As expected,
the effect of having contact with relatives is stronger in home countries that are less
developed and in which social spending is comparatively smaller. It is in these coun-
tries where we expect that social remittances will have the potential to create an active
coalition in favor of states that can deliver jobs and social protection.
More research is needed to understand the policy implications of our findings as
well as to improve empirical tests of the social remittance hypothesis. Although we
think that both having relatives abroad and communicating with them are good
proxies for trans-border communication, more qualitative research is needed to grasp
the specific contents of these trans-border conversations. Also, a pressing question is
whether the different attitudes toward the role of the state among those with family
abroad and in contact with it that we have found in this study translate into distinct
political behaviors. Do trans-border conversations simply modify attitudes without
having an effect on actual behaviors? In view of the extant research that shows that
trans-border communication makes those left behind more politically active, espe-
cially at the local level (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow, 2010; Careja & Emmenegger,
2012; Córdova & Hiskey, 2015), it makes sense to expect that changing attitudes will
be reflected in local activism demanding a more present state. This is a hypothesis
that future research should look into.
Endnotes
1The countries are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela,
Argentina, Dominican Republic. See information about the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.
2For instance, the LAPOP 2008 included a question explicitly surveying respon-
dents about what uses they give to remittances. About 70 percent stated that
remittances bought consumption (food, clothing), with education being the second
most declared destination of remittances, albeit mentioned by just 9 percent of the
respondents. Spending on housing is the third most frequent item mentioned in
the list.
3See also Rother, 2009 for a similar argument on the Philippine case and returning
migrants from Saudi Arabia.
4Ideally, this would be solved with a matched-sample survey, conducting interviews
among senders and recipients of the same households (Brown, Carling, Fransen, &
Siegel, 2014, p.1259). As an alternative, for each country, we calculated the percentage
of emigrants that settled down in developed countries as opposed to developing coun-
tries (United Nations, 2010). In some estimations, we included an interaction between
these percentages and the individual intensity of Contact. Although the results suggest
that the country of destination matters (only when most emigrants settled in developed
countries, prominently the U.S., were trans-border conversations significant) this
finding is tentative because we cannot rule out that the characteristics of those who
emigrate to advanced vs. developing countries are driving this finding. These results are
available in Appendix B.
5There is a low 2 % that reported receiving remittances, yet answered “no” when
asked whether he or she has close relatives who used to live in this household and are
Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 19 of 29now living abroad. This may be due to extended family or friends being the originators
of financial remittances. Remittance figures are very likely to be underestimated
because among other things, this survey does not ask about in-kind remittances. On
the challenges of measuring remittances accurately in survey designs and suggestions
for improving questionnaires, see Brown et al., (2014).
6The exact wording for all the questions is shown in Table 5, Appendix A.
7Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are shown in
Table 6 on the Appendix A.
8We tested to what extent social and financial remittances shape opinions concerning
how effectively governments are executing certain tasks (fighting unemployment, inse-
curity and poverty). We used our combined indicator of government efficacy as the
dependent variable. We observe a similar pattern, with those having relatives abroad
and communicating with them holding better opinions of the way governments do
their job (see Appendix C, Table 9).
9Pre-treatment variables that predict having relatives abroad are gender, age, marital
and employment status, race, and urban residency.
10This allows us to correct for the effects of non-random assignment and base our
causal inference on the conditional mean independence assumption, which basically
says that we can expect the units not exposed to treatment to react identically to those
observed under treatment, and the units exposed to treatment not to differ in their
control state from those observed under control. Figure 5 in the Appendix A shows the
balance between treated and untreated observations.
11Since we would be left with too few observations in each of the categories of inten-
sity of communication with relatives, we cannot explore the impact of varying degrees
of contact with relatives abroad. Also, note that the treatment we are interested in is
whether a respondent has family abroad or not and that we will keep only comparable
observations. This means that we lose a considerable number of observations. We con-
sider this fact an even stricter test of our hypotheses and whatever the finding, it will
be conservative.
12The latter was generated on the basis of the original variable (contact) and it takes
four values: No contact (No family abroad), Low contact (Never/Rarely), Medium con-
tact (Once or twice a month), High contact (Once or twice a week/Every day).
13The marginal effect of financial remittances at different levels of intensity of contact
are shown in the Appendix C, Fig. 9.
14The results are also robust to controlling for respondents’ intention to migrate.
15See Appendix A, Fig. 4 for an illustration of this variation.
16We conditioned the intensity of Contact with relatives abroad to an indicator that can
be taken to be a better proxy of government efficacy than the amount of spending, which
arguably would capture scope rather than efficiency. The indicator is the Human Opportun-
ity Index, HOI, siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-22276310889/
Book_HOI.pdf, which shows values from 46 (Nicaragua) to 91(Chile) and addresses inequal-
ity of opportunity in housing and education. This measure correlates 0.68 with social
spending per capita, showing that while the correlation is high, social spending does not
correlate one to one with equality of opportunities. Again, it is in origin countries with low
levels of HOI that contact with relatives is more relevant in shaping the views about what
roles the state should play (Fig. 10, Appendix C).
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Ros2, Ros3, Ros4 “The (Country) government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring
the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”
“The (Country) government, more than the private sector, has the primary responsibility for
creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?” “The
(Country) government should implement firm policies to reduce income inequality between
the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”
(1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.
Remittances Does your family receive remittances from abroad? (1) Yes (0) No
Family abroad Do you have close relatives who used to live in this household and are now living
abroad? Recoded to (1) Yes (0) No.
Dependence To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from
abroad? (0) No remittances (1) Nothing (2) Little (3) Some (4) A lot.
Contact How often do you communicate with them (family abroad)? (0) No family abroad
(1) Never (2) Rarely (3) Once or twice a month (4) One or twice per week (5) Everyday.
[As categorical variable: (1/2) Low (3) Medium (4/5) High]
Government
efficiency
Continuous variable constructed out of three items. To what extent would you say
the current administration fights poverty? To what extent would you say the current
administration improves citizen security?
To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment?
(1) Nothing (7) A lot
Socioeconomic Status
(SES)
Factors constructed out of the questions asking respondents whether they own Television (1)
Refrigerator (2) Conventional Telephone (3) Cellular telephone (4) Vehicle (5) Washing Machine
(6) Microwave oven (7) Motorcycle (8) Indoor plumbing (9) Indoor bathroom (10) Computer
Political interest How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some
(3) Little (4) None
Sociodemographic
variables
Age, Gender (Male = 1), Marital Status (Married = 1), Employment Status (Employed = 1),
Years of Education, Ethnic Background (White = 1)
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
Variables N Mean SD p50
Own key enterprise 58,318 4.406 2.130 5
Ensuring well-being 59,533 5.635 1.573 6
Create jobs 59,771 5.722 1.553 6
Reduce inequality 59,354 5.766 1.554 6
Remittances 61,131 0.0923 0.290 0
Family abroad 60,852 0.215 0.411 0
Dependence 61,051 0.254 0.856 0
Contact 60,739 0.625 1.296 0
Gov’t efficacy 58,819 3.736 1.644 3.667
Political interest 61,054 2.928 0.966 3
Education 61,305 9.188 4.535 10
SES factor 1 61,348 7.30e-05 0.793 −0.240
SES factor 2 61,348 0.0530 0.706 0.424
Sex (male) 61,605 0.485 0.500 0
Marital status (married) 61,198 0.585 0.493 1
Age 61,487 38.90 15.95 36
Employed (yes) 61,430 0.543 0.498 1
Race (white) 59,866 0.299 0.458 0
Table 7 Adjusted regression, treatment is receiving financial remittances
Ensure well-being Create jobs Reduce inequality
OLS PSM OLS PSM OLS PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittances 0.005 0.033 0.006 0.320 0.043 0.274
[0.029] [0.232] [0.028] [0.202] [0.028] [0.187]
Contact 0.016** 0.125** 0.021*** 0.013 0.008 0.068
[0.007] [0.058] [0.006] [0.048] [0.006] [0.050]
Gov’t efficiency 0.023*** 0.041 0.018*** 0.033 0.030*** 0.035
[0.005] [0.044] [0.005] [0.045] [0.005] [0.044]
Political interest −0.014* −0.003 0.019** −0.029 −0.036*** −0.008
[0.008] [0.080] [0.007] [0.072] [0.007] [0.074]
Intercept 5.116*** 5.242*** 5.736*** 6.488*** 5.683*** 6.374***
[0.072] [0.625] [0.070] [0.636] [0.070] [0.649]
Observations 53,830 1,622 54,009 1,630 53,711 1,629
R-squared 0.042 0.104 0.061 0.113 0.061 0.186
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race,
socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in brackets *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 8 The effect of emigrant destination
Emigration in the US Emigration in LDCs
Ensure well-being Create jobs Ensure well-being Create jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual level and interactions
Contact 0.0131 0.0144 0.0147** 0.0161
[0.008] [0.012] [0.007] [0.011]
Contact* % Emigration in US 0.000357 0.000566
[0.000] [0.000]
Contact* % Emigration in LDCs −0.000738** −0.00109*
[0.000] [0.001]
Remittances −0.00748 −0.0206 −0.00629 −0.0197
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Gov’t efficacy 0.0393*** 0.0337*** 0.0393*** 0.0337***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Political interest 0.0401 −0.0676 0.0319 −0.0766
[0.075] [0.089] [0.074] [0.086]
Constant 5.644*** 5.764*** 5.634*** 5.757***
[0.068] [0.080] [0.066] [0.077]
Country level
% Emigration in US −0.00425* −0.00343
[0.002] [0.003]
% Emigration in LDCs 0.00830** 0.00783*
[0.004] [0.004]
N2 18 18 18 18
N1 53830 53559 53830 53559
HLM estimations. Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race,
socioeconomic status. Country Level variables centered around the grand mean. Individual Level variables centered
around the country mean. Dummy variables are not centered. The slope of contact is allowed to vary across countries
Standard errors in brackets *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Fig. 7 Marginal Effect of Contact with Relatives on the Views about the Role of the State, as the % of
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Meseguer et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:13 Page 25 of 29Appendix CTable 10 Adjusted regressions (PSM), social remittances and the state in a reduced sample of
heavy financial remittance recipients
Create jobs Ensure well-being Reduce inequality
OLS PSM OLS PSM OLS PSM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittances −0.012 −0.112 −0.009 −0.034 0.025 0.019
(0.028) (0.133) (0.030) (0.135) (0.029) (0.125)
Family abroad 0.086*** 0.377*** 0.079*** 0.302** 0.066*** 0.184
(0.022) (0.130) (0.023) (0.126) (0.023) (0.124)
Gov’t efficacy 0.013** 0.054 0.028*** 0.070** 0.019*** 0.086**
(0.006) (0.037) (0.006) (0.035) (0.006) (0.035)
Political interest −0.017* −0.017 −0.048*** −0.060 −0.046*** 0.012
(0.009) (0.059) (0.010) (0.060) (0.010) (0.052)
Intercept 5.837*** 6.017*** 5.123*** 5.396*** 5.751*** 5.455***
(0.085) (0.563) (0.090) (0.499) (0.088) (0.517)
Observations 31,788 2,685 31,674 2,678 31,618 2,679
R2 0.037 0.049 0.032 0.038 0.029 0.058
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries included: El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru,
Mexico, Colombia
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race, socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 9 Financial and social remittances and the perception of state efficacy (baseline)
Gov’t efficacy Gov’t efficacy
(1) (2)
Remittances 0.000657
[0.027]
Family abroad 0.0400**
[0.019]
Dependence −0.00688
[0.010]
Contact 0.0134**
[0.006]
Political interest −0.209*** −0.209***
[0.008] [0.008]
Intercept 4.795*** 4.790***
[0.067] [0.067]
Observations 55076 54929
R2 0.137 0.137
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls are age, age^2, gender, education, marital status, employment status, race, socioeconomic status
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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